INTRODUCTION
Imagine that you finally buy the red sports car that you have always hoped to own. It comes equipped with a state of the art, patented folding top. The patent covers the combination of components in the folding top; however, it does not cover the individual parts. After several years of using the convertible, you notice that the fabric on the top is worn out and needs to be replaced. When you replace it, the patentee sues you for infringement, claiming that you replaced the heart or the essential part of the invention and, therefore, reconstructed the invention without permission. If this happens in Japan, you may lose and be held liable for infringement.
1 But if this happens to you in the United States, the Supreme Court has held that your actions constitute permissible repair.
2 If, however, the sale of the convertible was conditioned on a promise not to replace any parts of the folding top when they became spent, you would probably lose. 3 What is going on here? Should you be able to repair something you buy as often as needed and however necessary? Should a patentee be able to restrict your ability to repair your own car?
Thomas Jefferson understood that the new Union had to recognize intellectual property rights to develop a strong economy. Thus, Jefferson sought to incorporate into the U.S. Constitution a provision protecting inventors' rights to exploit their inventions. Securing intellectual property rights must have been of great significance to all of the Founding Fathers because "a brief Constitution of barely 4,486 words, includes a clause guaranteeing the 'right' of inventors . . . to royalties for patents . . . (the single mention of the term right in the body of the Constitution)." 4 Specifically, the Constitution, pursuant to Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8, gives Congress Abraham Lincoln was also a great champion of the patent system. 6 He stated that:
Before [the patent regime], any man might instantly use what another had invented; so that the inventor had no special advantage from his own invention. The patent system changed this; secured to the inventor, for a limited time, the exclusive use of his invention; and thereby added the fuel of interest to the fire of genius, in the discovery and production of new and useful things. Congress provided for this patent right in the Patent Act of 1952, which states that "whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell or sells any patented invention, within the United States . . . during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent." 8 The patent right has been interpreted by Congress and the federal courts to grant the inventor only the "right to exclude" others from practicing the invention; the patent right does not give the inventor the "exclusive right" to practice the invention. 9 Does this right to exclude also give patentees the right to prevent repairs of their inventions? Typically, patentees are considered to have given to the purchasers of their patented devices the authority to use the patented devices. 10 Generally, such authority also includes the ability to repair the device.
11
This grant of authority, however, does not include an unrestricted license to "make" another device. 12 At some point, repairs may be so extensive that they constitute a reconstruction, or unauthorized "making," of the patented device. 13 The distinction between minor repairs and extensive repairs that result in an impermissible reconstruction is not always clear. 5 . U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 6. In 1859, Lincoln gave a "Lecture on Discoveries and Inventions" in which he explained his views on the six steps in the history of liberty. See NOVAK, supra note 4, at 1. In this speech, Lincoln noted that the last great step in the history of liberty was the adoption of the U.S. Constitution with a provision securing intellectual property rights. See id. at 6-7.
7. Abraham Lincoln, Lecture on Discoveries and Inventions Jacksonville, Illinois, Feb. 11, 1859, in ABRAHAM LINCOLN:
SPEECHES AND WRITINGS, 1859-1865, at 10-11 (Don E. Fehrenbacher ed., 1989).
8. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1994). 9. See Giles Sutherland Rich, My Favorite Things, 35 IDEA 1, 3-4 (1994) (providing a brief history of the "exclusivity" of the patent rights).
10. See generally DONALD S. CHISUM, 5 CHISUM ON PATENTS § 16.03[2](a) (1998) (observing that under the "first sale" doctrine, the unconditioned sale of patented products to purchasers gives such purchasers the ability to use, resell, and repair the product).
11. This Article raises issues for discussion with respect to the distinction between permissible repair and impermissible reconstruction. Part I explores the emerging inconsistencies in the repair/reconstruction jurisprudence. Part II discusses problems patentees may face in attempting to redefine what constitutes "impermissible reconstruction" through private contracts with purchasers of their patented goods.
I. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN REPAIR AND RECONSTRUCTION

A. Supreme Court Jurisprudence
Permissible repair
The Supreme Court first dealt with the repair/reconstruction distinction in Wilson v. Simpson. 16 In Wilson, the Court held that, after several months of use, the replacement of worn out cutting knives from a patented wood planing machine constituted permissible repair.
17
The Court's reasoning, which is still considered authoritative on this subject, was that:
When the wearing or injury [to the patented device] is partial, then repair is restoration, and not reconstruction. . . . And it is no more than that, though it shall be a replacement of an essential part of a combination. . . . But if, as a whole, [the combination patented device] should happen to be broken, so that its parts could not be 14. See id. ("The line between permissible 'repair' and impermissible 'reconstruction' is a difficult one to draw and is the subject of numerous cases.").
15 It should be noted that the roll of paper was not separately patented. 21 The Court explained that: the purchaser of the new roll does precisely what the patentee intended he should do; he replaces that which is in its nature perishable, and without the replacement of which the remainder of the device is of no value. The replacement is of a product which it is the object of the mechanism to deliver.
22
The Court also noted that the "distinction between repair and reconstruction becomes of no value [in this case], since the renewal of the paper is in a proper sense, neither one nor the other."
23
In a similar case, Heyer v. Duplicator Manufacturing Co., 24 Justice Holmes, writing for the Court, found that the replacement of gelatine bands for use in a patented copying machine was not reconstruction. 25 Holmes explained that:
The owner when he bought one of these machines had a right to suppose that he was free to maintain it in use, without the further consent of the seller, for more than the sixty days in which the present gelatine might be used up. The machine lasts indefinitely, the bands are exhausted after a limited use and manifestly must be replaced. . . . The machine is costly, the bands are a cheap and common article of commerce. . . . We have only to establish the construction of a bargain on principles of common sense applied to the specific facts. This patent covered a combination of unpatentable parts.
29
In determining whether reconstruction or repair had occurred, the Court relied on a "practical test" espoused by Judge Learned Hand: "'The [patent] monopolist cannot prevent those to whom he sells from . . . reconditioning articles worn by use, unless they in fact make a new article. '" 30 In concluding that replacing the spent fabric was permissible repair, the Court explained that:
No element, not itself separately patented, that constitutes one of the elements of a combination patent is entitled to patent monopoly, however essential it may be to the patented combination and no matter how costly or difficult replacement may be. . . . Mere replacement of individual unpatented parts, one at a time, whether of the same part repeatedly or different parts successively, is no more than the lawful right of the owner to repair his property.
31
The Court, therefore, rejected the "heart of the invention" test, which analyzes whether the most essential element is being replaced.
32
Similarly, the Court rejected an analysis of the time or expense of the adjustment to determine whether repair or reconstruction had occurred. 33 The Court also held that there would be no impermissible reconstruction by replacing components of a patented device unless the individual component was patented separately or the entire device was rebuilt at one time. at 344 (rejecting the argument that the fabric being replaced constituted the "heart" of the invention, and therefore, the patent must be held to grant a "monopoly" on the fabric). It seems difficult to understand how one would apply the "heart of the invention" test. The heart of the invention could be (1) the part that is non-obvious over the prior art; (2) the most expensive component of the patented device; or (3) the largest element of the patented device.
33. See id. (refusing to consider that the replacement of a "relatively durable" or "expensive" element of a patented device constitutes "infringing 'reconstruction'").
34 the life of the part replaced in relation to the useful life of the whole combination, the importance of the replaced element to the inventive concept, the cost of the component relative to the cost of the combination, the common sense understanding and intention of the patent owner and the buyer of the combination as to its perishable components, whether the purchased component replaces a worn-out part or is brought for some other purpose, and other pertinent factors.
36
Three justices dissented but agreed with Justice Brennan that numerous factors should be applied to determine whether repair or reconstruction has occurred.
37 Justice Black, who fully supported the majority opinion, wrote separately to criticize the multi-factor approach espoused by the minority. 38 Justice Black warned that such an approach would result in the application of: a Pandora's flock of insignificant standards, especially when it is recognized, as it must be upon analysis, that consistent application of the standards suggested would actually change the basic test from "making" to something not satisfactorily defined but indisputably different. And surely the scope of a patent should never depend upon a psychoanalysis of the patentee's or purchaser ' The purchaser of the patented machine retained a repairperson to clean and sandblast his rusted machines and to resize six of the thirty-five elements to enable the machines to pack fish into a different size can. 42 The court reasoned that: [The] . . . machines were not spent; they had years of usefulness remaining though they needed cleaning and repair . . . . When six of the 35 elements of the combination patent were resized or relocated, no invasion of the patent resulted, for . . . the size of [the] cans serviced by the machine was no part of the invention. . . . Petitioners in adapting the old machines to a related use were doing more than repair in the customary sense; but what they did was kin to repair for it bore on the useful capacity of the old combination, on which the royalty had been paid. 43 Overall, it appears that the Supreme Court consistently views impermissible reconstruction as occurring only when all the parts of a patented device (comprising a combination of unpatented elements) are replaced simultaneously.
44
The Supreme Court rejected any "heart of the invention" test or "difficulty of replacement" test. 45 Under such jurisprudence, one might think that the Supreme Court would rarely consider a repair to be so extensive as to constitute a reconstruction. The Supreme Court, however, has identified some instances of impermissible reconstruction, as demonstrated in the following cases.
Impermissible reconstruction
In Cotton-Tie Co. v. Simmons, 46 the Supreme Court made its first finding that alleged repairs were really reconstructions.
47
The plaintiffs had patents for a metallic cotton-bale tie that was comprised of a metal band and a buckle.
48
The buckle was stamped with the 41. See id. at 425 (concluding that although the modification of the non-patented components of a fish canning machine "improved the usefulness" of the machine, it did not make the adaptation a "reconstruction").
42. 
1999] REPAIR/RECONSTRUCTION DISTINCTION 1213
words "Licensed to use once only." 49 The band would remain around the bale of cotton until it was cut, at which point the tie was discarded. 50 The defendants purchased the buckle and band as scrapiron, recreated the bands, and sold them as new ties. 51 The Court reasoned that this was reconstruction:
What the defendants did in piecing together the pieces of the old band was not a repair of the band or the tie, in any proper sense. The band was voluntarily severed by the consumer at the cottonmill because the tie had performed its function of confining the bale of cotton in its transit . . . . Its capacity for use as a tie was voluntarily destroyed. As it left the bale it could not be used again as a tie. As a tie the defendants reconstructed it, although they used the old buckle without repairing that.
52
It appears that the Court believed the patented device could only be used once and any repair after that first and final use was a reconstruction. 53 In Aro, the Supreme Court explained that the fact that the ties were marked "Licensed to use once only" was significant in the finding of impermissible reconstruction. 54 In Morgan Envelope Co. v. Albany Perforated Wrapping Co., 55 the Supreme Court expounded on the "licensed to use one only" language. 56 The Court explained that it was evident that "the use of the tie was intended to be as complete a destruction of [the device] as would be the explosion of a patented torpedo. In either case, the repair of the band or the refilling of the shell would be a practical reconstruction of the device." The question remains as to whether it was an enforceable contractual restriction or whether the Supreme Court gave deference to the patentee's noncontractual intention. Justice Harlan's dissent noted that nothing turned on the fact that this language was included on the ties. See id. at 374 n.3 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (remarking that although the Court, in Cotton-Tie, did refer to the language marked on the ties, "it is manifest that nothing really turned on that point").
55 the Supreme Court held that the sale of phonograph records for use in a patented combination of a stylus and record was impermissible reconstruction. 59 The Court stated that:
It would seem that on principle when deterioration of an element has reached the point of unfitness there is a destruction of the combination and a renewal of the element is a reconstruction of the combination. And it would also seem on principle that there could be no license implied from difference in the durability of the elements or periodicity in their use.
60
The Court's decision in Leeds seems to have been based on four factors. First, the Court noted that the discs were the "distinction of the invention, constituting . . . the advance upon the prior art." 61 Second, the discs were in "active co-operation" with the stylus; the function performed by the patented device was the result of the "joint action of the disc and stylus." 62 Third, the records were not perishable; they remained useful "for an indefinite period . . . usually [lasting] as long as does the vogue of the sounds they record." 63 Fourth, the defendant's records were not being used to replace broken or worn-out records, but merely "to increase the repertory of tunes" of the owner of the patented combination. 64 It is difficult to reconcile the decision and reasoning of Leeds with that of Wilson and Morgan, which were decided before Leeds. Wilson stated that replacement of a an essential part of a combination would constitute repair and not reconstruction. 65 Was the toilet paper roll and the fixture not in "active cooperation" epairing partial injuries, whether they occur from accident or from a wear and tear, is only refitting a machine for use. And it is no more than that, though it shall be a replacement of an essential part of a combination.").
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however, "active cooperation" was not considered a factor in the distinction between repair and reconstruction.
66
Can the statement of general principles outlined in Leeds be reconciled with any prior or subsequent Supreme Court case?
In addition, why should it matter that the purchasers in Leeds were using the allegedly infringing records to "increase their repertory of tunes"? 67 Is this relevant to whether the device is truly being "reconstructed"? Obviously, the device is not being reconstructed because it can do something entirely different with the new records namely, play new tunes. This factor seems to be more relevant with respect to whether the purchasers of the patented device are exceeding the scope of their "implied license" to use the device rather than whether they are reconstructing the device. In addition, it should be noted that in Wilbur the Supreme Court expressly approved adjusting the patented fish-canning machines to enable the machines to perform a different function because the royalty had already been paid for those machines. 68 Why should the result in Leeds be any different?
B. Reconciling Federal Circuit Jurisprudence with Supreme Court Precedent
The Aro & Aktiebolag decisions
Although it would be difficult to prove reconstruction under Aro, recently the Federal Circuit has identified an example of impermissible reconstruction in Aktiebolag v. E.J. Co.
69
In Aktiebolag, the patents claimed a drill with a shank portion and a unique carbide tip geometry.
70
Over time, the drill tip would dullen and need resharpening. 71 The drill tip was not patented separately and Aktiebolag issued guidelines explaining how to resharpen the tip. 72 Aktiebolag did not allege that resharpening the tip was infringement. 73 Rather, Aktiebolag alleged that retipping the drill when the tip could no longer be sharpened due to damage constituted reconstruction. There are a number of factors to consider in determining whether a defendant has made a new article, after the device has become spent, including the nature of the actions by the defendant, the nature of the device and how it is designed (namely, whether one of the components of the patented combination has a shorter useful life than the whole), whether a market has developed to manufacture or service the part at issue and objective evidence of the intent of the patentee.
75
It should be noted that the court cited to no authority to support its statement. This may have been because no Supreme Court precedent supports such a proposition. Aktiebolag seems to resurrect Justice Brennan's minority position advocating the use of a multifactored test to determine the distinction between repair and reconstruction.
76
To determine whether replacing the drill tip was reconstruction, the Federal Circuit examined several factors. First, the drill was spent when the drill tip could no longer be resharpened, unless it was retipped.
77 Second, retipping required a complex procedure of breaking the damaged tip and creating a completely new tip. 78 Third, the drill tip was not an easily detachable part, such as the knives in Wilson, and was not intended to have a shorter life than the drill shank.
79 Fourth, there is no evidence of a substantial drill retipping market, which would tend to show there would be a reasonable expectation that the tip would require frequent replacement. 80 [T]he nature of the work done by E.J. shows that retipping is more like reconstruction than repair. E.J. does not just attach a new part for a worn part, but rather must go through several steps to replace, configure and integrate the tip into the shank. It has to break the worn or damaged tip from the shank by heating it to 1300 degrees Fahrenheit. It brazes to the shank a new rectangular block of carbide and grinds and machines it to the proper diameter and creates the point. Thereafter, the tip is honed and sharpened, grinding the rake surfaces and the center of the point and honing the edges. These actions are effectively a re-creation of the patented invention after it is spent. Id., 43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1623.
79. The Federal Circuit cited Aro to support the proposition that examining the expected life of the replaced part is a relevant factor. See id., 43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1623. The Aro court, however, merely recounted the fact that the fabric was expected to have a shorter life than the convertible car top in its recitation of the facts of the case. See Aro, 365 U.S. at 336, 337-38. The Aro decision did not discuss the expected life of the fabric as a factor to be considered during its analysis of the distinction between repair and reconstruction. See id.
80. Again, the Aktiebolag court cited Aro to support its assertion that the existence of a replacement industry is a factor to be considered. This case raises numerous interesting questions. With regard to the second factor noted by the Aktiebolag court, Aro seemed to indicate that replacing an essential element at high cost and with difficulty was not the test to determine whether repair or reconstruction had occurred. 82 Specifically, Aro stated that:
The Court of Appeals found that the fabric "is not a minor or relatively inexpensive component" of the patented combination, or an element that would expectedly wear out after a very short period of use-although its "expectable life span" is shorter than that of the other components-and for these reasons concluded that "an owner would [not] rationally believe that he was making only a minor repair" . . . . We think that test was erroneous.
83
The Aro court then explicitly rejected the proposal that "when an element of a patented machine or combination is relatively durable . . . relatively expensive, relatively difficult to replace, and is an 'essential' or 'distinguishing' part of the patented combination, any replacement of that element, when it wears out or is otherwise spent, constitutes infringing 'reconstruction.'" 84 How can Aktiebolag's analysis of these factors be reconciled with Aro's explicit rejection of these factors? Did Aktiebolag implicitly resurrect the "heart of the invention" test that was rejected by Aro? Did Aktiebolag in effect resurrect the reasoning in Leeds regarding the "essential" feature of the replacement part and its necessity in performing the function of the patented device? Should the repair/reconstruction distinction hinge on whether the part being replaced is easily detachable? The records in Leeds were easily detachable and yet replacement of such records was found to constitute reconstruction of the device.
85
With regard to the third factor, can this case be distinguished from the reconfiguration that occurred in Wilbur, where the Supreme Court found permissible repair? 86 In addition, was not the fifth factor (BNA) at 1624. The Court in Aro, however, did not discuss this as a factor to be considered. The Court merely stated the fact that a fabric replacement industry existed in the factual background of the opinion. See Aro, 365 U.S. at 338 (noting that Aro Manufacturing is a national leader in the production of replacement fabrics for convertible tops). The Court did not advocate using this as a factor to determine whether a repair is really a reconstruction. The defendant in Sage Products, Devon, manufactured inner containers that could be used with the Sage system. 97 Sage argued that, when the inner containers were replaced, Sage's disposals system was impermissibly reconstructed. 98 More specifically, Sage argued that, because it was physically possible to reuse the inner containers after their first use, there was a disputed material fact as to whether the inner containers were spent; therefore, the grant of summary judgment was inappropriate. 99 The Federal Circuit dismissed this argument in light of Sage's own warnings to customers to use the inner container only once. 100 Ultimately, the Federal Circuit held that replacing the inner containers was permissible and summary judgment had been properly granted in favor of Devon.
101
Given the holding in American Cotton-Tie, why was replacing the damaged inner container not viewed as reconstruction in the same way that replacing the band in the cotton tie was held to be reconstruction? In both cases, the patentees expressed their intent that the replaced part was to be used only once. 102 In both cases, the entire patented device could not be used without having one element of the device completely replaced.
103
Is a distinguishing factor between American Cotton-Tie and Sage that in American Cotton-Tie the purchasers of the original patented products were discarding their products whereas in Sage, the purchasers wanted to repair the containers for their own future use? Are the courts merely balancing the equities between the patentee and the purchasers and therefore, because no purchaser was involved in American Cotton-Tie, the patentee won? Should the repair/reconstruction distinction turn on whether the purchasers believe they can, or should be able, to replace a part of the patented invention? 102. See American Cotton-Tie Co. v. Simmons, 106 U.S. 89, 91 (1882) (noting that the patentee marketed these replacement parts as a one-use-only product); Sage Prods., 45 F.3d at 1576, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1766 (noting Sage's specification and warning containers that mandate a single use only and Sage's refusal to sell to buyers who reuse the inner container).
103. See American Cotton-Tie, 106 U.S. at 91 (noting that when the bale reaches the cottonmill the band is cut, separating the band and the buckle); Sage Prods., 45 F.3d at 1577, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1766 (noting that the inner container of the 413 combination was intended to be discarded when full so that in order to reuse the 413 combination, the inner container must be replaced).
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This leads to the question of whose noncontractual intention, if any, should count-the patentee's intent or the purchaser's? The patentee's noncontractual intent seems to be a "one way street." If she believes that a certain part will need to be replaced often, then she cannot complain later when the purchaser replaces that part. 104 Generally, the patentee's noncontractual intent that her device not be repaired is, however, given little weight, 105 although the Aktiebolag court did consider the patentee's noncontractual intent to be a persuasive factor in finding reconstruction. "[a] lthough the repair or reconstruction issue does not turn on the intention of the patentee alone, the fact that no replacement drill tips have ever been made or sold by the patentee is consistent with the conclusion that replacement of the carbide tip is not a permissible repair").
107. See Heyer v. Duplicator Mfg. Co., 263 U.S. 100, 102 (1923) ("We have only to establish the construction of a bargain on principles of common sense applied to specific facts. We cannot doubt what the fair interpretation is and it would not be affected even if every purchaser knew that the vendor was prepared to furnish new bands.").
108. See American Cotton-Tie, 106 U.S. at 93 (appearing to use the consumer's decision to throw away the cotton tie after the band was broken as evidence that the combination was spent after one use).
109. The Court instructs you that you should consider all the evidence presented by the parties as to the useful life of the [parts of the combination], the relative cost, and all other evidence offered on that subject in an effort to determine whether or not this is a repair or a reconstruction.
[* * *]
Now the plaintiff contends, as I pointed out to you, that this is the heart of the invention and that to make the reel, manufacture it and to sell it new violates the very heart of the patent. The defendants say and contend that it's repair, that they bought the overall machine, and that this is only a part and that to make [it] new and to replace it is nothing more than repair. Now you must determine from this evidence which of these contentions is correct.
112
The jury instructions seem to direct the jury to focus on a "heart of the invention" test and authorize the jury to consider numerous factors (i.e., "all the evidence offered on that subject") in determining whether a repair or a reconstruction had occurred.
113
This seems contrary to the clear mandate of Aro.
114
The Federal Circuit, however, affirmed the lower court decision, finding no clear error in the jury instructions.
115 It should also be noted that several 115. It should be noted that the case may have turned on weak arguments that were made too late to an appellate court. See generally Lummus Indus., 862 F.2d at 270-71, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1985-86. The appellants argued to the Federal Circuit that the instruction should have included "the question of 'whether the nature of the reels is such that their repeated replacement is, and is expected to be, necessary to maintain the usefulness of the apparatus as a whole during its anticipated useful life.'" Id. years after this case was decided, the Federal Circuit explicitly rejected the argument that "pre-mature" repair (i.e., the replacement of a part before it is worn out) could constitute reconstruction, 116 although it approved of the jury instruction in Lummus regarding the requirement that a part be worn out before it can be repaired.
117
C. Summary
Overall, many questions remain unanswered regarding the evolution of the repair/reconstruction doctrine. Are judges acting in a logically consistent manner by determining that restoration of a product is merely a repair rather than an infringing reconstruction, or is the "practical test" advocated by the Supreme Court merely a "we know a reconstruction when we see it" test? Is the balancing of numerous factors a useful framework, or would a bright-line test be better? If Aro announced a bright-line test for assessing the distinction between repair and reconstruction (i.e., unless all the unpatented elements of a patented combination are simultaneously replaced, there can be no reconstruction), 118 why has the Federal Circuit rejected the notion that a bright-line test could work in this area?
119 Does the current framework provide adequate public notice In response to these ambiguities, many patent owners have tried to contract out of this inconsistent public law regime through private contracts with purchasers of their patented products.
120
The next section of this Article explores whether patentees should be able to contract out of patent law as a matter of public policy. The section addresses whether patent law is binding as part of the "social contract," or merely is a source of default rules that individuals can alter by "private contract."
II. THE PRIVATIZATION OF THE REPAIR/RECONSTRUCTION DISTINCTION
Whenever a legal doctrine generates the type of controversy and uncertainty that currently surrounds the repair/reconstruction doctrine, it is either clarified by the courts and the legislature, or by clever attorneys who design private contractual alternatives to avoid the public legal regime. As discussed previously, in the long history of the repair/reconstruction doctrine, the question has virtually always been whether a particular modification of the patented product amounts to a repair or a reconstruction in the absence of any type of contractual restriction. 121 In other words, the issue is whether there has a been a violation of the property (patent) right. As more recent case law demonstrates, parties are beginning to determine by contract what constitutes an impermissible reconstruction.
122
Increasingly, the Federal Circuit is faced with the question of whether parties should be able to contract out of the public law regime with respect to the repair/reconstruction doctrine.
123
The Federal Circuit was presented with such an issue in at 1077. Although FMC complained that the repair/reconstruction distinction was amorphous and requested clarification for "both patent owners and potential infringers," the Federal Circuit refused to issue a bright-line test "for determining whether reconstruction has taken place in those cases where all of the replacement under investigation has taken place at the same time" because that case was not before the court. See id. at 1078 (emphasis added).
120. See infra notes 135-44 and accompanying text (discussing the patentees' use of contract to limit the uses to which a patented product can be put by the purchaser and to avoid the repair/reconstruction doctrine).
121. In Mallinckrodt, the patentee brought both a patent infringement and inducement to infringe claim against a hospital and an aftermarket restoration company.
125
The hospitals purchased Mallinckrodt's patented medical devices, which were accompanied by "single use only" notice. After the devices had initially been used, the hospitals contracted with another private company (Medipart) to service the devices returning them to operable condition.
The district court did not consider whether the "single use only" notice was legally sufficient to constitute a valid contract. 126 Rather, the district court held that as a matter of patent law, the "single use only" restriction was not enforceable as a violation of the first sale doctrine, which gives purchasers the right to use the patented products they have purchased. 127 The district court's decision not to enforce the contract was primarily based on public policy grounds.
128
On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed, holding that there was no precedent to support the district court's reasoning that a patent holder could not restrict the initial purchaser's use of the patented product.
129
The court stated the "single use only" restriction "does not per se violate the doctrine of patent misuse or the antitrust law. Use in violation of a valid restriction may be remedied under the patent law, provided that no other law prevents enforcement of the patent." 130 The court remanded for a determination of whether the sale of the medical device was "validly conditioned under the applicable law such as the law governing sales and licenses and [whether] the restriction on reuse was within the scope of the patent grant or otherwise justified . . . ."
131
If the district court found the sale validly conditioned and within the scope of the patent or otherwise justified, then violation of the restriction could be remedied by an action for patent infringement. 132 The court also explained that "if reuse [the] exhaustion doctrine, however, does not apply to an expressly conditional sale or license. In such a transaction, it is more reasonable to infer that the parties negotiated a price that reflects only the value of the "use" rights conferred by the patentee. As a result, express conditions accompanying the sale or license of a patented product are generally upheld. 141 Thus, after Mallinckrodt, it appears that, by contractually limiting the number of times a patented product may be used by an initial purchaser, a patentee may be able to contract out of the [Vol. 48:1205 repair/reconstruction doctrine.
142
Mallinckrodt, however, also raises several interesting questions regarding the enforceability of use restrictions on patented products.
A. Single Use Only Restrictions as Patent Misuse
The Mallinckrodt court considered the issue of the enforceability of the single use restriction to be an issue of patent misuse. The grant to the inventor of the special privilege of a patent monopoly carries out a public policy adopted by the Constitution and the laws of the United States, "to promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to . . . Inventors the exclusive right . . ." to their "new and useful" inventions. The issue of contracting out of public intellectual property law is being hotly debated in scholarly journals and the press with respect to "shrinkwrap" or "click wrap" licenses in the copyright context.
148
One of the issues is the enforceability of agreements that require the purchasers of copyrighted materials to give up their fair use rights.
149
Another issue focuses on whether parties can decide what is a "work of authorship" by contract, thereby securing copyright rights where federal law normally would not grant them.
150
The concern is whether such agreements will "upset the federal copyright bargain." 148. "Click wrap" licenses are agreements whereby an Internet user must "click" on an icon and agree to the terms specified therein to access a particular web site. "Shrinkwrap" licenses are agreements that become effective when the consumer opens the plastic "shrinkwrap" on the software package. See generally ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449 (7th Cir. 1996) (discussing "shrinkwrap" licenses in general, and holding that these licenses are enforceable unless they violate contract law), rev'g 908 F. A Framework for Determining Unenforceability, 68 NEB. L. REV. 816, 831-32 (1989) (arguing that a copyright owners' attempts to eliminate fair use rights through contractual agreements should be evaluated for enforcement under a rule of reason standard).
150. See ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1453-54 (discussing whether shrinkwrap licenses that are treated as contracts should be enforceable under the Copyright Act because 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) preempts any "legal or equitable rights [under state law] that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by section 106 in works of authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of expression and come within the subject matter of copyright as specified by sections 102 and 103").
151. Charles R. McManis, The Privatization (or "Shrink-Wrapping") of American Copyright Law, 87 CAL. L. REV. 173, 176 (1999) (explaining that with the shrink-wrap licenses and click-here contracts, the copyright industry can mass-distribute copyrighted works and require users to relinquish federally created users' privileges, which is inconsistent with federal copyright law, which establishes certain protections for copyright owners, and certain copy rights for users). As another commentator has stated:
Users are arguably always subject to restrictions when they use a copyrighted work. But restrictions imposed by copyright law are limited and reflect the balance between the need to induce creation and the need to guarantee public access to information. If copyright owners are free to use contractual arrangements to restrict use, and are then able to use copyright to prevent any use that is not subject to these restrictions, owners are gaining an absolute monopoly over their works. 
